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Eurasia: Playing Field or Battle Field? 
Defining an Effective German and  
European Approach on Connectivity  
Toward China and Russia
Jacopo Maria Pepe
Whereas the West is fragmenting, Eurasia is emerging as a fluid continent, where 
Russia and China are pursuing an alternative international system that rivals the 
multilateral, rules-based order. Despite diverging interests, they have been link-
ing their Eurasian integration projects, China’s Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI) and 
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). To avoid marginalization and the loss 
of Europe’s trade and regulatory power in Eurasia, the EU and Germany should 
adjust their Central Asia strategy: Focusing on Greater Central Asia and Greater 
Eastern Europe, they should define an interest-driven, flexible, and regionally diver-
sified approach toward Russia and China. They should engage both powers with a 
strategic mix of cooperation and competition, but also cooperate with third coun-
tries. Eurasia should be prioritized in Europe’s industrial policy, and more means 
committed to developing the infrastructure linking Central Europe, Central Eastern 
Europe and Western Eurasia.
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This paper is based on the discussions and findings from two workshops, which took part in Berlin and Moscow in Octo-
ber and December 2018, as part of the project “EU-China-Russia-Central Asia Strategic Dialogue on Connectivity” run by 
the Robert Bosch Center of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).  
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 . The vast space stretching from Eastern Europe to 
Central and East Asia and from the Baltic Sea to the 
Indian Ocean is turning into a crucial geo-economic 
chessboard of the 21st century. In this macro region, 
Russia and China are laying the basis for an alternative 
international system that differs vastly from the current 
one.
 . Two major factors have reshaped Eurasia in the past 
decade: First, since the 2008 financial crisis, Eurasian 
trade ties among different Eurasian countries and 
regions have increased and diversified. Second, the 
Ukraine conflict (2014) has accelerated and cemented 
the already growing Sino-Russian geopolitical entente. 
As a result, Europe and the West have been politically 
and economically marginalized in the region.
 . For the European Union and Germany, Russia and 
China today represent two different challenges: Mos-
cow is increasingly perceived as a short-term geopo-
litical security threat, while Beijing is regarded as the 
emerging geo-economic and systemic competitor of the 
coming decades. Reflecting the different nature of these 
challenges, Russian and Chinese projects for economic 
integration in the region differ fundamentally in scope 
and nature.
 . Driven by Moscow’s geopolitical aspirations and protec-
tionist agenda in the former Soviet space, the Eurasian 
Economic Union promotes a closed economic regional-
ism. It is constrained by limited resources, the lack of 
economic complementarity among its members, and 
non-functioning supranational institutions. By contrast, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a format set to shape 
a globalization that carries Chinese characteristics and 
spreads Chinese norms and standards across the coun-
tries involved. Chinese experts have identified so-called 
“collapsing zones”, i.e. the less connected and less 
developed parts and sub-regions of Eurasia, as prime 
targets for a complex strategic approach that combines 
acquiring and controlling infrastructure assets, export-
ing commercial overcapacities and creating asymmetric 
dependencies (“debt diplomacy”). 
 . In light of the growing economic and infrastructure 
connections between the two regional initiatives and 
the increasing geopolitical synchronization between 
Moscow and Beijing, Europe requires a holistic ap-
proach to both, as Eurasia’s reconnection process 
poses both, a risk and a major opportunity for Europe. 
It offers the latter, especially when considering that 
Beijing’s and Moscow’s interests might not be aligned 
everywhere across Eurasia.
 . The EU Connectivity Strategy from October 2018 is a 
first step in the right direction, yet it lacks clear political 
ownership, a substantial financial commitment and the 
identification of overarching strategic goals to shape 
bilateral relations with China and Russia in a broader 
vision for Eurasia.
 . Meanwhile, the recently approved new EU Central Asia 
Strategy from June 2019 shows that Brussels increas-
ingly considers this region crucial for its interests in 
Eurasia and key for the implementation of the EU 
Connectivity strategy. However, it still lacks a real-
istic assessment of its strategic options and concrete 
instruments to engage with both, China and Russia, in 
Central Asia. 
 . Given its pivotal role, both, in the EU and in trade with 
Russia and China, Germany should take the lead in 
developing a new Eurasian dimension for the EU’s for-
eign and foreign economic policy. In doing so, it should 
also apply a more geo-strategic approach. This should 
integrate distinctive bilateral strategies toward Russia, 
China, and other subregions like the Eastern Neighbor-
hood or Central Asia within a broader strategic frame-
work which also considers how the growing interaction 
between China and Russia impacts on Europe. Together 
with other EU partners – especially with Italy, France, 
and Poland as well as the newly elected Commission 
President, Ursula von der Leyen, and the new High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Josep Borrell –, Berlin should identify few, key strategic 
goals, develop action plans for the two key Eurasian re-
gions, Greater Central Asia and Greater Eastern Europe, 
and design a compact investment and industrial policy 
offensive for Eurasia.
 . By doing so, Europe would engage both, Russia and 
China, in a strategically smart triangle based on flexible 
and ad-hoc relations. The course of action in this tri-
angle should involve a mix of cooperation, and competi-
tion, as well as external balancing with third powers; it 
should weigh up Europe’s own interests and means and, 
if possible, carefully exploit latent conflicts and ten-
sions in the Sino-Russian relations.
Executive Summary
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Introduction: Eurasian Order and  
Resurgent Power Politics
While the West has been fragmenting, Eurasia has been 
emerging as a single, yet fluid and unstable playing field 
in recent years. In this vast space stretching from East 
Central Europe to East Asia, and from the Baltic Sea to 
the Indian Ocean, Russia and China are laying the basis 
for an alternative international system. It is here, that the 
side-effects of a resurgent great power politics are par-
ticularly visible. Here, regional military and trade-eco-
nomic blocks are superseding the rules-based multilateral 
order, challenging globalization and open markets. And 
here, imperial legacies – from the Chinese via the Russian 
to the Turkic and Iranian – are re-emerging and moving 
to the forefront of contemporary politics, along with dif-
ferent understandings of the world order. Although not 
destroyed, the Europe-centred Westphalian state system 
and the Western liberal order are being “diluted and 
dispersed”1 as a result. 
While the United States under the administration of 
President Donald Trump is rapidly adapting to this reality, 
the transatlantic relations are under increasing pressure. 
As the Munich Security Conference in February 2019 illus-
trated, this ‘new normal’ finds Europe and Germany ever 
more challenged in their quest for a multilateral, rules-
based world order, and bar of proper instruments to stand 
the growing geopolitical and geo-economic competition.2
Against this backdrop, re-defining relations with China 
and Russia, the two major Eurasian powers, will be one 
of the most challenging tasks for both European and Ger-
man policy makers in the coming decades. It is even more 
pertinent as, across Eurasia, the interests of Germany and 
other EU partners, particularly on the EU’s Eastern bor-
der from the Baltic to the Black Sea, are affected by the 
growing interaction between Russia and China, and their 
respective projects of regional and continental integra-
tion, i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
In fact, this new Eurasian mega-continent is turn-
ing out to be the crucial geo-economic and geopolitical 
chessboard of the 21st century, and the reconnection of 
its economies and infrastructure poses both, risk and op-
portunity, for Europe and Germany. Although difficult to 
navigate given its complexity and high risks, the emer-
gence of Eurasia as a geopolitical factor requires:
first and foremost, the formulation of few, clear goals 
to confront and engage with Russia and China, doubtless-
ly the two paramount powers in this mega space, as well 
as a regionally differentiated strategy to pursue them; 
second, active participation in Eurasia’s infrastruc-
tural and economic reconnection by means of long-term 
financial commitment, in order to take advantage of the 
unprecedented opportunities which the continent’s recon-
nection offers, while avoiding the loss of political, eco-
nomic and commercial centrality.
The recent EU connectivity strategy, approved in Octo-
ber 20183, is undoubtedly an important starting point to 
strengthen the EU’s action across the continent. However, 
the strategy lacks clear political ownership as well as a 
substantial financial commitment, and the identification 
of overarching strategic goals to pursue bilateral relations 
with China and Russia in a broader vision for Eurasia.
Using the connectivity strategy as a vantage point, and 
with a view to the EU’s limited resources, this paper sets 
out possible goals for a smart EU geo-strategy in Eurasia 
which, on the one hand, minimizes the risks arising from 
Russia’s and China’s combined action and, on the other, 
maximizes the chances that arise from the continent’s 
manifold reconnection.
Due to its pivotal role, both, in the EU and in relations 
with Russia and China, it will be especially up to Ger-
many to develop a new Eurasian dimension for the EU’s 
foreign and foreign economic policy, and to bring to it a 
more geo-strategic approach. This should integrate much-
needed distinctive, bilateral strategies toward Russia 
and China in a broader strategic framework which also 
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considers how the growing interaction between China 
and Russia impacts on the EU.
Accordingly, Germany should lead the EU in develop-
ing a new and appealing Eurasian narrative which is 
based on openly declared interests, the formulation of 
clear political goals, and the definition of regionally diver-
sified priorities. Building on this, Germany’s diplomacy 
could define and pursue a flexible smart approach which 
navigates between Eurasia’s two great powers and engag-
es them in an ad-hoc, issue-specific way, without choosing 
one over the other as a privileged partner, or confronting 
both simultaneously. Furthermore, together with France, 
other EU partners, and in coordination with the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), Germany should identify 
Greater Central Asia and Greater Eastern Europe as key 
Eurasian regions in which to engage Russia and China in 
a smart triangle based on flexible and ad-hoc relations. 
Action in this triangle should involve a mix of coopera-
tion and competition as well as external balancing with 
third countries; it should realistically assess own strategic 
goals and means and, if possible, carefully exploit latent 
conflicts in the Sino-Russian relations.
Losing Traction: European Influence in  
Eurasia after the Financial Crisis
The accelerated globalization of the early 2000s has led 
to the emergence of a system of multiple interconnect-
ing centres of economic and political power, which were 
initially driven by the interaction between Asian energy 
consumers and Eurasian energy producers.4 Since the 
2008 economic and financial crises, Eurasian trade ties 
have further increased and diversified, largely by-passing 
the West.
Parallel to the economic and financial 
crises, and their negative and long-lasting 
impact on Western and European economies, 
significant transformations occurred inside 
China. The enormous stimulus package 
of roughly 600 billion USD5 launched by 
Beijing in 2009 helped China to overcome 
the crises’ negative impact on its economy. 
However, it also accelerated the shift in 
economic-industrial activities from China’s 
coast to its central provinces. As part of this 
shift, the transport network was expanded 
to the westernmost provinces of Central 
Eurasia. Above all, the necessity to export li-
quidity and overcapacities of goods, created 
by the package, to new markets increased. 
In combination, these factors ultimately paved the way for 
the launch of the BRI in 2013, which has, in turn, acceler-
ated China’s economic, financial and political expansion 
across Eurasia.6 This development has significatively 
re-defined the geo-economic relations between the three 
main players in Eurasia – Europe, China, and Russia –, 
and it has had a major impact on the countries located in 
the intermediate spaces of the vast Eurasian continent, 
such as Central Asia and Central Eastern Europe.
At first glance, the EU still holds a prominent posi-
tion in this geo-economic triangle: Trade between China 
and Europe has sky-rocketed to roughly 560 billion EUR 
since the early 2000s,7 and the EU remains the privileged 
source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the main 
trading partner for many Eurasian countries, including 
Russia. A closer look at the development in the triangle 
involving Europe, China, and Russia over the past twenty 
years, however, offers a more differentiated picture.
As the graph in Figure 1 shows, EU exports to Eurasia 
– here broadly defined to include the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Middle East, non-EU Europe, 
and developing Asia – still exceed China’s exports to this 
variegated space. However, the gap is closing rapidly, 
with a dramatic acceleration in Chinese exports following 
the 2008 financial and economic crisis. While EU exports 
to this vast space superseded those of China six times in 
2000 (EU’s export: 145 Billion USD, China’s export: 25 Bil-
lion), the difference was dramatically reduced to slightly 
less than 140 Billion USD by 2017 (EU’s export: 660 Billion 
USD, China’s export: 522,9 Billion USD). Crucial to this 
were Chinese companies which rapidly gained shares in 
Eurasia’s key developing markets and in sectors where 
American and European companies have traditionally 
been considered dominant. 
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Figure 1: EU and China Exports to Eurasia 2000-2017, Aggregated, 
in Billion USD
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This trend has particularly affected Germany, the EU’s 
strongest, most diversified, and best performing manu-
facturing economy, in developing and emerging markets. 
Since the outbreak of the international financial and eco-
nomic crisis in 2008, in countries and regions like Russia, 
Kazakhstan, the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia, 
German companies have either lost market shares or have 
been confronted with greater competition from China in 
advanced sectors like industrial machineries, the chemi-
cal industry as well as electronic equipment, and telecom-
munications.8 
China, in turn, has been rapidly catching up with 
Europe for final destinations for exports from Eurasia’s 
energy producers, as the country’s demand for raw ma-
terials increases. While Europe has remained the main 
destination for exports from broader Eurasia (490 billion 
USD in 2017), exports to China increased seven-fold 
between 2000 and 2017, jumping from less than 40 billion 
USD to almost 320 billion USD (Figure 2)
Gaining Traction: The Sino-Russian Entente 
after the Ukraine Crisis 
The Sino-Russian trade turnover has profited from both, 
China’s deepening ties with Eurasia and Beijing’s growing 
demand for energy: At less than 7 billion USD before 2000 
(Figure 3), it reached more than 80 billion USD in 2017 
and increased further to 110 billion USD in 2018.9 Com-
pared to the Russian-European or Sino-European trade, 
however, it has remained limited to a much smaller num-
ber of commodities, and highly dependent on the volatile 
oil price. Nonetheless, it has developed fast over the past 
decade, with Russian trade focusing away from Europe 
and speedily progressing toward China. For instance, 
China has superseded Germany as Russia’s biggest single 
trade partner, and Russian imports from China are now 
twice as high as Russian imports from Germany.10 
While the increase of trade between Moscow and 
China resulted directly from Beijing’s general re-orienta-
tion toward Eurasia after the 2008 economic and financial 
crises, the political and economic relations between the 
two countries have also been accelerated 
due to geopolitical factors. These were the 
Ukraine crisis (2014) and Russia’s increasing 
isolation from the West. 
In geopolitical terms, the Sino-Russian 
strategic realignment actually pre-dates 
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: 
Going back to the early 2000s, it has evolved 
into a pragmatic “axis of convenience,”11 
which became even more pertinent after 
the outbreak of the financial and economic 
crises in 2008. The Russian elite, in particu-
lar, seemed to regard the perceived “decline 
of the West and rise of the rest” as an ideal 
opportunity to realize the post-Western mul-
tipolar world depicted by President Vladimir 
Putin in his speech at the 2007 Munich 
Security Conference.12 A strategic axis with 
Beijing would offer Moscow the perfect chance to profit 
from Asia’s and China’s economic strength. And, in their 
view, it could be reached by positioning Russia at the 
centre of a Central Eurasian customs and economic block, 
i.e. the Eurasian Custom Union and later the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), which could have facilitated 
trade between Asia and Europe.
However, while the Russian-Chinese rapprochement 
has a long history, the catalysts accelerating Russia’s pivot 
to Asia were undoubtedly, in the West, the Ukraine crisis 
and, in the East, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The Ukraine conflict not only estranged Moscow from 
Europe even further, but it also changed Moscow’s scope 
of action in Central Eurasia. As a result, the Kreml moved 
to sign the long-announced gas deal with Beijing in 2014 
and, at the same time, set out to turn the upcoming EAEU 
into a closed regional block that was to be synchronized 
with China’s BRI.
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Figure 2: Eurasia Exports to EU and China 2000-2017, Aggregated,  
in Billion USD 
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BRI-EAEU Coordination in a Reconnected 
Eurasia: A Singular Strategic Challenge for 
Europe?
For the EU and Germany, Russia and China represent two 
very different challenges: While Moscow is increasingly 
perceived as a short-term geopolitical-security threat13, 
Beijing is regarded as the emerging geo-economic and 
systemic competitor14 of the coming decades. Despite the 
structural developments discussed above, it is through 
this prism that Brussels and Berlin assess Russia’s and 
China’s projects for regional and continental integration, 
the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road 
Initiative. EAEU and BRI are, therefore, considered fun-
damentally different in scope and nature, and they are 
approached separately.
The Russian-led EAEU, which came into force in 2015, 
is seen as an instrument of Moscow’s geopolitical aspi-
rations in the former Soviet space. Its closed economic 
regionalism serves Moscow’s protectionist agenda better 
than an open and free continental-wide integration 
would; equally, it is less tailored to the interests of other 
EAEU members like Kazakhstan and Belarus. With lim-
ited resources, little economic complementarity among its 
members, and barely functioning supranational insti-
tutions15, the EAEU hardly presents itself as a possible 
political partner for the EU. Indeed, Brussels has, to date, 
steered clear of any form of more structured, political 
cooperation with it, instead restricting relations to the 
exchange of technical information.
In contrast to this rather limited view of the EAEU, 
Brussels sees the BRI as the main instrument by which 
China seeks to establish itself as the next great power and 
by which it pursues a complex strategy aimed at shaping 
a globalization that carries Chinese characteristics and 
imposes Chinese norms and standards. The tools used 
by Beijing as part of this strategy include acquiring and 
controlling infrastructure assets, exporting industrial 
production and commercial overcapacities and creating 
asymmetric political and economic dependencies (“debt 
diplomacy”). They are applied in what Chinese experts 
have defined as Eurasia’s “collapsing zone,”16 i.e. the less 
connected and less developed regions of Central Eur-
asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East that stretches 
between Asia and Western Europe. 
While China also plays a crucial role for Germany and 
the EU as an economic, political and diplomatic part-
ner, its growing assertiveness poses an unprecedent and 
unexpected challenge for Berlin and Brussels. Beijing is 
not only rapidly catching up with the West in technologi-
cal and industrial terms. In recent years, it has also been 
gaining an ambivalent level of political and economic 
influence along the Silk Road countries and beyond. 
Channelled through the BRI, this influence is now ex-
panding to include even some EU members, and Beijing is 
increasing and exploiting divisions within the Union. The 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Author’s Graph
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Figure 3: China’s Trade with Russia 2000-2017, in Billion USD
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16+1 forum between China and Central Eastern Europe, 
established in 2012, is the most debated example of this 
growing influence.17 The recent decision by Italy – as 
the first G7 country to do so – to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding with China in the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative is, undoubtedly, a hugely symbolic 
political and diplomatic success for China in this regard.
Against this backdrop, China and the BRI represent 
long-term challenges which require a unique and proactive 
strategic response from the EU; Brussel can certainly not 
repeat the approach of ‘containing and ignoring’ it has so 
far applied to Russia and the EAEU. The EU Commission 
and key member states like France and Germany have been 
seeking to strengthen Brussels’ negotiating position by 
developing a coherent EU approach toward China. As the 
results of the latest EU-China summit in April 2019 indicate, 
these attempts seem to bear first fruits.18 
Yet, taken together – and despite the differences 
between the two –, the BRI and the EAEU make up a 
singular strategic challenge for the EU, which will require 
a rather more holistic European approach. And any stra-
tegic response will have to take account of a multitude 
of factors: The geo-economic transformations of the past 
decade and the Sino-Russian geopolitical realignment fol-
lowing the crisis in Ukraine have not only eroded the EU’s 
geo-economic pre-eminence and political influence across 
the continent. Especially in the fields of cross-border 
transport and energy infrastructure reconnection, they 
have also unfolded a mix of competition and cooperation 
among different Eurasian players, which the EU has for 
too long ignored.
Of course, connectivity and technological transforma-
tion offer opportunities for win-win cooperation and eco-
nomic integration across the Eurasian continent. Increas-
ingly, however, the enhancement of physical and digital 
links as well as trade ties is also becoming an ever more 
important geo-economic struggle over norms, standards 
and rules, as well as for the control over and use of new 
supply and value chains, and for access to and trade with 
new markets. 
In the transport sector, for instance, new corridors 
have emerged as economically profitable solutions 
primarily for certain categories of high-value goods be-
tween China and Europe. Transcontinental transport has 
undoubtedly profited from the boom in Sino-European 
bilateral trade (Figure 4): As of today, roughly 4 to 7 
percent of trade between the EU and China is transported 
across Eurasia and Central Eastern Europe to the affluent 
markets of Western Europe. This amounts to an estimated 
trade value of 22 to 45 billion USD, a huge rise from 2012 
when it stood at less than 1 percent.19
While these increases both in services and value are 
impressive, it must be noted that the total volume of 
goods transported across Eurasia remains low compared 
to that delivered by maritime transport. Indeed, its share 
will probably never challenge that of seaborne trade over 
long distances. What is striking, however, is the degree 
to which the boom in overland transport between Europa 
and Asia has benefitted the development of trans- and in-
tra-regional trade corridors that do not necessarily end in 
Europe. From the Baltics to the Black Sea and the Caspian 
Sea, from Central Asian countries to Iran, Turkey, India, 
and Japan, countries have developed visions for enhanc-
ing transcontinental trade and connectivity in line with 
their geopolitical and geo-economic priorities.20 In doing 
so, they have been turning maritime and continental 
Eurasia into a complex web of potentially interconnected 
yet also competing transport lines that are increasingly 
oriented toward the Asia Pacific (Figure 5). In a way, Eur-
asia has become a “spaghetti bowl”21 of different regional 
trade integration initiatives. 
In the energy sector, the centre of the global market 
has also shifted toward the Asia Pacific, in a trend illus-
trated by the increase in exports from Eurasia to China, 
which, in turn, has resulted from the rising demand for 
raw materials. As leading producer of hydrocarbon, Rus-
sia plans to create a common energy market within the 
EAEU by 2025, as a first step toward greater coordination 
with and toward the Asia-Pacific. As Kirsten Westphal 
Source: Roland Berger, JOC.com, Author’s Graph.
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Figure 4: Volumes Transported on the Asia-Europe-Asia 
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and Marina Pastukhova argue, “the harmonisation of 
norms and rules, the standardisation of pricing mecha-
nisms and the codification of standards and data all relate 
initially only to energy trading within the EAEU. But the 
EAEU is also working on its external relations. In Asia, it 
has encountered interest both among individual states – 
including India, Mongolia, Singapore and Vietnam – and 
from international organisations seeking economic coop-
eration with the EAEU and participation (also financial) 
in its integration processes.”22 
Source: Stephan Barisitz, Austrian National Bank, from: “The New Silk Road - A Geo-Economic Assessment and Implications for Europe and Central 
Asia,” Presentation at “Private Sector Initiatives and Economic Diplomacy in Central Asia,” Brussels, September 18, 2018, with technical cartographic 
expertise of Florian Partl.
Figure 5: Energy and Non-Energy Transport Infrastructure Corridors across Eurasia, Planned and in Building
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Although it is unclear how quickly this integrated 
market will emerge, any step in this direction will present 
Europe with a new policy dilemma in its larger neighbor-
hood. The EU has connected, expanded and synchronized 
its internal gas market and electric power grid. However, 
it still has to develop its external approach to Eurasian en-
ergy producers and markets in a way that would strength-
en its own regulatory power without insulating and dis-
connecting itself from the continent. In fact, the EU has 
largely failed to connect regulatory-technical decisions 
to a clear and coherent geopolitical strategy, particularly 
vis-à-vis Russia and the EAEU. This is manifest not only 
by the disconnection of the Baltic states from the Russian 
power grid, but also by the failure of the Nabuccco Pipe-
line and the dispute over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 
By contrast, China and Russia – the two main drivers 
of connectivity and regional integration in continental 
Eurasia-– have done better in this geo-economic contest: 
To date, they have been able to manage their conflicts of 
interests and bring to bear even the still limited and asym-
metrical economic interdependence across Eurasia. As a 
result, they have grown geopolitically and ideologically 
closer than in any other period of their recent history.23 
Even though the 2015 EAEU-BRI cooperation agree-
ment has not yet met its economic expectations, it 
signalled China’s and Russia’s combined political will to 
synchronize the two initiatives.24 And the recent agree-
ment on trade and economic cooperation, signed by the 
EAEU and China in May 2018, has opened a new phase in 
the cooperation between the two powers. The deal not 
only “reduces some trade barriers and simplifies customs 
procedures, creating a foundation for deeper integration”; 
For the first time also, “member countries of the EEU have 
the opportunity to build relationships with China from a 
multi-stakeholder partnership perspective and creating a 
relative balance of power and interests.”25 This is particu-
larly true in regard to cooperation in the transport sector: 
Their diverging interests notwithstanding, the two 
continental powers have, here, proven able to politically 
synchronize their initiatives and find a balance in shared 
subregions, such as Northeast Asia and Central Asia. In 
fact, they have managed to develop balanced container 
traffic flows between routes that cross the Russian Far 
East and those which run across Central Asia. In doing 
so, they have carefully avoided any open competition 
between them.
Sino-Russian cooperation today even extends to the se-
curity and military realm. Beijing and Moscow carry out 
joint military drills in the Asia-Pacific (Vostok18), while 
managing their respective security interests in Central 
Asia via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
All this shows that, while China and Russia have 
scarcely coordinated their political and economic action 
toward Western and Central-Eastern Europe, they have 
been able to coordinate and manage conflicts and inter-
ests, especially when denying access to or limiting the 
influence of external Western powers. Here, they have 
jointly managed their respective interests, both along the 
southern Eurasian rimland and across Central Eurasia.
The Current EU Connectivity Strategy:  
A Concept without Strategic Goals 
Against this backdrop, the EU’s chances to engage in a 
triangular relationship with China and Russia seem fairly 
low. What makes things worse – and shows off the EU’s 
strategic vulnerability – is the fact that the EU is ideologi-
cally, politically and strategically far more distant from 
China and Russia than the latter are from each other.
However, it is exactly Europe’s and Germany’s strate-
gic vulnerability which makes a holistic and interlinked 
strategic response to Eurasia’s great powers and to their 
initiatives, EAEU and BRI, even more urgent: “Vulner-
able powers need strategy in its purest sense, as a set of 
stratagems or artifices to compensate for gaps in physical 
capabilities.”26 
A strategic European approach is important also in 
light of the fact that Eurasia’s increasing interdependence 
does not only entail the risk of geopolitical marginal-
ization and geo-economic competition for Europa and 
Germany. On the contrary, it also offers great economic 
and commercial potential. At a time in which a trade war 
between the EU, China and the United States has become 
a reality, the possible access to new markets in Africa and 
Eurasia is an attractive, albeit high-risk prospect. Accord-
ing to a 2016 study by Alicia Garcia Herrero and Jianwei 
Xu at Bruegel, for instance, EU exports would increase 
by 6 percent27, if all announced BRI projects were to be 
realized as planned. Even today, Germany’s trade with 
the BRI-region (excluding China) alone makes up up to 20 
percent of the country’s total trade exchange.28
It makes sense, then, that Germany – Europe’s leading 
economy, and therefore particularly exposed to the ef-
fects of the Sino-Russian entente and Eurasia’s changing 
geo-economics – has pressed the EU to enhance conti-
nental connectivity in recent years. It is now at the core 
of a number of European strategies and initiatives, such 
as the 2016 Global Strategy29, the EU-China Connectiv-
ity Platform of 201830, and, most recently, the document 
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“Connecting Europe and Asia –Building Blocks for an EU 
Strategy.”31 It was presented in September 2018 as Joint 
Communication by the EU Commission and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and adopted by the Coun-
cil of the European Union in October 2018.32
Among these moves, the latter, specifically, represents 
the most serious attempt by the EU to build up its stra-
tegic action and responsiveness via a sustainable, com-
prehensive and rules-based approach to connectivity. In 
contrast to China’s BRI and Russia’s closed regionalism 
via the EAEU, the European approach to connectivity 
fosters win-win partnerships that avoid debt traps or 
unilateral dependencies. Instead, it prioritizes sustainable 
investments and the adherence to social, environmental, 
security, and human rights standards. To achieve these 
goals, the strategy aims to open bilateral and regional co-
operation in different Eurasian and Asian subregions and 
with countries like Japan or members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It does so, however, 
without defining the scope, priorities, and details of such 
cooperation. The EU strategy also implements new fi-
nancing instruments to spur on public and private invest-
ments in addition to the existing mechanisms, namely the 
Neighborhood Investment Facility (NIF), the Investment 
Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), the Investment Facility 
for Asia (IFA) and the Investment Plan for Europe. Fur-
thermore, it seeks to mobilize a combination of funding 
sources by bringing in more private investment. 
This new strategy paper and the proposed instruments 
represent an important first step and a good framework 
for action. They certainly exemplify the goal of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy attempt to employ 
more geo-economic tools, including the strategic use of 
economic integration agreements (EIAs) and economic 
sanction regimes.33 
Despite this positive direction, however, Europe’s con-
nectivity strategy remains flawed. In particular, it lacks 
three fundamental elements: What is missing, first, are 
political ownership, clearly defined strategic goals and 
political priorities toward China and its BRI, Russia and 
the EAEU as well as other players. Second, it has not set 
out any strategic regional and sectorial priorities that 
would be part of any articulated action vis-à-vis Russia 
and China. And third, it is not backed up by the financial 
firepower required to realize its plans and seriously com-
pete with China, in particular. 
Toward a Realistic Eurasian Strategy: Policy 
Recommendations for the EU and Germany
To benefit from the prospects of Eurasian connectivity, 
Europe thus needs to adjust its strategic approach. This 
should be pursued parallel to any tactically motivated, 
short-term, and reactive diplomacy. It will again be up to 
Berlin to urge the EU to develop and pursue a more stra-
tegically oriented, long-term, proactive, and, where pos-
sible, triangular diplomacy in Eurasia. Ideally, it should 
be embedded in a more holistic strategy which considers 
the tools of the “geo-economic diplomacy”34 as part of a 
more explicitly interest-driven, geostrategic approach.
The Groundwork: Formulating Strategic Interests, 
Assessing Options for Action
Developing a successful new Eurasia strategy will have to 
begin with a clear definition of the EU’s and Germany’s 
strategic goals, and a solid understanding of the funda-
mental interests that drive them. Based on these goals, 
the political instruments available need to be analyzed for 
inherent risks, and assessed in the context of the political, 
economic and geopolitical dynamics at play in Eurasia 
and among the powers involved in the region. Possible 
limitations for the EU and Germany itself will equally 
have to be considered, before determining the best stra-
tegic approach and making policy recommendations for 
specific courses of action. 
Defining Few and Clear Strategic Goals:  
The Fundamental Interests of Germany and the EU
As a first step, Berlin, in particular, should clearly articu-
late and communicate its own legitimate interests vis-à-
vis Russia and China, and synchronize these with those of 
other key EU countries like France, Poland, and Italy. Key 
interests in this respect are: 
First, Germany and many European states have a vital 
interest in deepening trade and commercial ties across 
Eurasia. This is the case despite the fact that, geopoliti-
cally, the further development of relations with Russia and 
China could also cause divisions and tensions inside the EU. 
Ties should be extended, specifically, with China, and to a 
lesser extent, with Russia. At the same time, (new) market 
shares should be consolidated, regained or won in third 
regions and countries like Central Asia, East and West Asia, 
India, Iran, and Turkey in order to rebalance any possible 
over-reliance on trade with both China and the US. 
Second, both Berlin and its European partners have 
an interest in upgrading and extending trade lines of 
communication and in keeping them open and accessible. 
This concerns trade connections, both by land and by sea, 
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across continental and maritime Eurasia. To be stabilized, 
protected and expanded at the same time are Germany’s 
and the EU’s own supply and value chains, particularly in 
the space between Eastern Europe and Western Eurasia, 
i.e. from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the Eastern 
Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. 
Third, in pursuing greater connectivity, commer-
cial partnerships and trade agreements, the EU is also 
interested in promoting its own rules, standards and 
norms. Its intention in doing so is not only to support its 
own legitimate economic and trade interests, but also to 
increase good governance practices and, by consequence, 
the attractiveness of its own model of governance. 
Calibrating the Right Mix of Instruments:  
Cooperation, Competition and Balancing 
Apart from clearly defining their fundamental goals for 
a future connectivity strategy toward Eurasia, Germany 
and Europe also need to frankly assess the mix of political 
and economic tools available to them. This is pertinent 
especially in light of their limited financial and political 
leverage vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing and with regard to 
the strong ideological and strategic bond between the lat-
ter. It is also important given the United States’ declining 
commitment to the liberal political and economic order. 
Weighing up possible instruments, Brussels and Berlin 
have three distinct – yet also equally problematic – op-
tions to pursue their goals: 
Cooperation: This course would involve entering into 
a triangular partnership across Eurasia by normalizing 
and stabilizing the relations with both Moscow and 
Beijing. Cooperation with the BRI and the EAEU would be 
elevated from a technical-economic to a political level, yet 
without developing or articulating a separate, own vision 
or narrative for the continent. Europe would strive to 
actively participate in Eurasia’s geo-economic transforma-
tion solely by the force of its own regulatory and norma-
tive as well as commercial power. 
This option, of course, is laden with difficulties: It 
would send a dramatic signal of strategic autonomy to the 
US which Washington could barely accept. Furthermore, 
given the EU’s limited political, diplomatic, financial and 
military means and the lack of an own alternative nar-
rative for Eurasia, Brussels would hardly be considered 
a fully-fledged partner in such a triangular relationship. 
More realistically, the EU would end up being side-lined, 
marginalized and, by consequence, also further frag-
mented internally. It could eventually even be forced 
to yield its own regulatory, normative, and commercial 
power. In effect, Brussels could become a rule taker.
Competition: This option implies entering a de facto 
systemic competition with China and Russia, as the EU 
would develop its own autonomous concept for Eurasia’s 
future. It would be independent from both China’s aggres-
sive mercantilist approach and Russia’s closed regional-
ism. Instead, it would be based on technical goals – e.g. 
the spread and acceptance of international norms and 
standards – and on the principles of multilateralism, open 
markets, and mutually beneficial partnerships. 
Although it carefully avoids any reference to China or 
Russia as possible targets of such a systemic competition, 
this is the scenario envisaged by the EU connectivity strat-
egy. The inherent risk in this approach lies in the fact that 
the increasingly nationalist and isolationist US no longer 
provides an external anchor of protection that strengthens 
the European position. Itself bar of sufficient financial, mil-
itary and political means to sustain a two-front competi-
tion with Moscow and Beijing independently, the EU could 
eventually face a similar destiny as in the first scenario.
Balancing: Given the limitations inherent in the first 
two options, a more realistic approach may to pursuing 
a partnership with only one of the two Eurasian powers 
in order to balance off, contain or isolate the other player. 
Indeed, this option might be more promising and there-
fore deserves more attention. For, while the Sino-Russian 
bond is solid, it is by no means a fully-fledged strategic al-
liance without frictions. As Bobo Lo has pointed out, Mos-
cow’s and Beijing’s interests diverge in a number of areas. 
Apart from their ideological alignment, these include the 
very perception of the international system, relations 
with the US, and the understanding of their countries’ 
respective role in the multipolar order.35 
As a matter of fact, these latent but managed frictions 
between Russia and China have become evident espe-
cially in Eurasia. Here, Moscow and Beijing are, indeed, 
not on the same page in terms of their economic, security 
as well as geopolitical interests:
In the economic field, Russia’s and China’s goals in Eur-
asia differ as a result of their uneven economic strength: 
Russia aims to diversify its economy and to develop new 
markets outside Europe and China in the sectors of arms 
and energy supply, technology, and infrastructure. How-
ever, although the EAEU and the BRI now cooperate more 
closely and the Sino-Russian axis is limited but solid, Rus-
sia’s economic weaknesses have left the country hostage 
to its pivot to China. Moscow is increasingly becoming the 
junior partner. As a result, Russia is keen to diversify trade 
and transport ties with other countries, both in East Asia 
(e.g. Japan and South Korea) and elsewhere across the 
continent (e.g. Turkey and India). In fact, Russia wants to 
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position itself at the heart of the BRI, but it largely wants 
to do so in order to increase its internal connectivity to its 
Far East. By contrast, it hopes to retain its monopolistic 
position in the trans-Eurasian transport corridor. China, in 
turn, shares this interest only partially. It seeks to achieve 
maximum connectivity to Europe across a whole range of 
different and alternative corridors which do not necessar-
ily rely on Russia. Beijing wants to maximize its access to 
resources and boost its economic prosperity by increasing 
China’s share of foreign markets along the Silk Road. This 
puts it in conflict with Moscow’s closed regionalism that is 
manifest, for instance, in the EAEU. 
In security terms, Russia and China differ in their 
strategic approach to instability and stability in the re-
gion: Russia wants to preserve its position as the primary 
security provider in Eurasia and hopes to maintain this 
division of labor in Sino-Russian relations in the region. 
For Moscow, security issues need not be solved but man-
aged. Alleviating its own lack of economic and soft power, 
Russia’s security strategy relies on controlled instability, 
as this secures a lasting demand for Russian-provided 
security in the region. China, by contrast, wants stabi-
lization: Its security goals are to support authoritarian 
regimes and to solve rather than manage crises. 
In geopolitical terms, finally, Russian and Chinese 
prerogatives also differ clearly: Russia’s number one 
priority is to consolidate itself as a center of global power. 
It, therefore, promotes itself as the security provider in 
Eurasia, and beyond the post-Soviet space. It therefore 
also seeks to keep the West out of the region as much as 
possible, and cultivates closer ties with other powers, all 
the while without jeopardizing the Sino-Russian relations. 
Conversely, China looks to maximize its strategic flex-
ibility and to avoid open trouble on the geopolitical stage. 
While managing Russia and its sensitivities, it seeks to be 
as independent as possible from the US and to secure its 
own perception as a universal actor. 
It is obvious, thus, that the Chinese and Russian align-
ment is by no means without cracks, and their differences 
go well beyond minutiae, instead involving fundamen-
tal economic, security and geopolitical goals. However, 
despite these frictions, both Moscow and Beijing have 
learned from history, and they are wary of allowing third 
powers to exploit their diverging interests with a Kissing-
er-like approach. This is especially true in regard to the 
EU, which has much less negotiating power at its disposal 
than the US, and whose relations with Russia are still 
strongly overshadowed by the conflict in Ukraine. 
Therefore, chances are slim for the EU to re-establish 
ties with Moscow by proposing a new version of the 
modernization partnership and, thereby, to leverage 
Russia’s disappointment about China’s lack of invest-
ments in its economy. Russian-European relations lack 
trust and have remained in a deadlock also geopoliti-
cally since the Ukraine crisis and the ongoing, subse-
quent mutual sanction regimes. Equally, there is little 
promise in attempting to engage China by instrumental-
izing Moscow’s economic weaknesses, its aggressive and 
destabilizing foreign policy, or its protectionist attitude. 
Given China’s combined focus on stability and strategic 
flexibility, this approach hardly offers enough of an 
incentive for Beijing to openly isolate or by-pass Moscow, 
and to embrace Brussels instead. 
Whether cooperation, competition or a balancing ap-
proach, it seems, therefore, that deciding on any of these 
options – at least per se – represents a choice between a 
rock and a hard place. However, a smart, regionally ar-
ticulated strategy, which navigates between the three and 
flexibly mixes some elements of all them, could turn out 
to be the best possible approach for the EU and Germany 
under the given circumstances and at this given point. 
This involves three important steps in particular. 
First, Germany, along with key EU partners like France, 
Italy and Poland as well as the EU institutions – particular-
ly the new High Representatve for Foreign Policy – should 
first work on developing a distinct, alternative narrative 
for Eurasia. This narrative should signal that the Eurasian 
vector of the EU’s foreign policy is gaining relevance and 
political ownership far beyond any technical aspects. In 
fact, it should state clearly that Eurasia has become the 
financial, diplomatic and strategic priority of the EU’s and 
Germany’s foreign policy for the coming decades. 
Based on clearly formulated interests as discussed 
above, the EU’s and Germany’s new Eurasia narrative 
should include the possibility of political cooperation, 
both bilateral and trilateral, with China’s BRI and/or Rus-
sia’s EAEU. At the same time, it should openly consider 
the option of competition where interests clearly diverge. 
Where the latter is the case, strong cooperation should 
be sought with key third countries that pursue a similar 
Eurasian agenda and hold converging interests in dealing 
with Russia and China. Among these countries are, specif-
ically, Turkey, Japan, and India. 
Second, in articulating their new Eurasia strategy, the 
EU and Germany should prioritize action toward two core 
regions, Greater Central Asia (GCA) and Greater Eastern 
Europe (GEE). They should adapt their engagement to the 
level of available resources, and according to the political 
and economic stakes and the power leverages vis-à-vis 
Russia and China that are involved in any course of action. 
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To be maintained throughout is the fundamental coher-
ence of the strategy, which includes harmonizing and 
coordinating the strategic planning for any action in the 
two regions.
Third, in the medium to long term, the EU and Germany 
should significantly increase their financial commitment 
to the Eurasian connectivity agenda. This should begin but 
by no means be limited to the new Multiannual Financial 
Framework, i.e. the new EU budget for 2021-2027.
To reach these goals, cooperation with France re-
mains crucial for Berlin: A functioning axis with Paris 
is essential to advance any effective common European 
foreign, foreign economic as well as defense and security 
policy, whether at a global or a Eurasian level. This is well 
illustrated by Germany’s and France’s joint efforts toward 
a more proactive European industrial policy based on Eu-
ropean “champions”, and toward the coordinated defense 
and security policy.  However, a solely French and Ger-
man initiative on Eurasia would lack strategic depth and 
also have a limited chance of implementation if it did not 
expand to include at least two other EU member states, 
Italy and Poland. Both have been increasingly difficult 
partners, particularly for Berlin, as their nationalist gov-
ernments have grown more and more critical of certain 
EU and German policies, particularly on fiscal, energy 
and migration matters. Italy recently embraced China’s 
BRI in a move openly intended to reaffirm its national 
interests, as opposed to a more coordinated European ap-
proach. Warsaw, in turn, has been more wary of China’s 
initiative. It has also advocated a tougher stance on Rus-
sia and is vehemently opposed to Nord Stream 2. Despite 
their divergences, however, Poland and Italy continue 
to be pivotal powers in the crucial geo-economic and 
geopolitical belt that connects the Baltic with the Eastern 
Mediterranean, via Central Eastern Europe, where China 
and Russia have been expanding their activities and influ-
ence. Including Warsaw and Rome in any coordinated 
activities toward Eurasia would not only make geopoliti-
cal and geo-economic sense. It would also reopen their 
strategic dialogue with Berlin and help identify possible 
shared interests in the field of connectivity.
The Geographic Focus: Devising Action in Greater 
Central Asia and Greater Eastern Europe
The two macro-regions at the center of the new Eurasia 
strategy should be Greater Central Asia (GCA), includ-
ing the five Central Asia countries, the three Caucasus 
republics and Afghanistan, and Greater Eastern Europe 
(GEE), stretching from the Baltics to the Black Sea and 
roughly including the countries of the Western Balkans, 
the Eastern Partnership countries and Turkey.
Greater Central Asia: The EU-BRI-EAEU Connectivity 
Agenda and Bilateral Cooperation with Third Parties 
In Greater Central Asia, the EU and Germany hold less 
leverage vis-à-vis China and Russia than in Greater 
Eastern Europe, yet the EU’s strategic interest in the 
region is growing. The recently approved new Central 
Asia Strategy,36 which comes more than 10 years after 
the first, manifests not only the EU’s growing strategic 
efforts to streamline its financial instruments, ensure 
more effective action and expand its political cooperation 
with Central Asian countries via Enhanced Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements. It also shows that, for the 
EU, Central Asia is becoming strategically more and more 
important as an extended space linking Afghanistan and 
the Caucasus. As a result, Brussels considers this large re-
gion crucial to the implementation of the EU-Connectivity 
strategy. With its focus on sustainable connectivity and 
regional cooperation, and by including the Caspian Basin 
and Afghanistan, the EU Central Asia strategy doubt-
lessly represents a great step in the right direction. It also 
rightly addresses the changes which have occurred in the 
region in the aftermath of Uzbekistan’s new reform path. 
However, Greater Central Asia could and should also 
be considered by the EU as a possible space for a limited 
yet substantial trilateral connectivity agenda with both 
China and Russia. In this region, China, Russia, and the 
EU hold a number of converging interests which would al-
low different connectivity initiatives to come together on 
a series of issues. Examples could be, e.g. supporting the 
WTO agenda of Uzbekistan, and urging Tadzhikistan to 
enter the convention on investment protection. Another 
possibility would be cooperating on the integration of 
markets, logistics and border management in the broader 
Caspian region, including the western shore of the Cas-
pian Sea and, possibly, Iran.
In general, though, the EU-China connectivity plat-
form, the EU-Connectivity strategy and the connectivity 
component of the EU Central Asia strategy only make lim-
ited sense, if the EAEU is not included. For, many existing 
barriers to international freight result precisely from the 
lack of cooperation between the EU and the EAEU. While 
sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions 
impede any major political cooperation with Moscow in 
the short term, the EU could consider enhancing its coop-
eration with the EAEU up to a point that goes beyond the 
merely technical yet does not yet reach political levels. 
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In doing so, the EU would politically recognize the role 
of the EAEU’s supranational bodies, such as the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. On matters of transport, the 
commission ranges above single governments, includ-
ing Moscow, as it is responsible for the implementation 
of a common transport space across the EAEU. Thus, an 
EU-China Connectivity platform enlarged to include the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, and thereby the EAEU, 
could focus on the issues of regulatory convergence, har-
monization, and the standardization of custom clearance 
procedures for trans-continental traffic. It could tackle 
the coordination of investment policies in infrastructural 
bottlenecks, in particular, at border crossings between 
China and Russia, China and Kazakhstan as well as 
Belarus and Poland. Furthermore, it could pursue the 
creation of logistics hubs in the EAEU countries as well 
as in the Polish railway infrastructure. The former would 
subsequently also facilitate greater traffic volumes in 
the regions en route between Europe to China, and the 
latter would help align TEN-T corridors with the northern 
and the southern trans-Eurasian route.37 Including the 
Eurasian Economic Commission’s representative in the 
dialogue between the EU and China would also enable 
Europe to understand the ongoing internal competition 
among EAEU members as well as between China and 
Russia in the field of transport, which has been slowing 
the implementation of a common transport space across 
the EAEU.38 And, finally, it would help Europe to identify 
opportunities for alternative corridors crossing Central 
Asian countries, yet by-passing Russia. 
In the areas of security and border management, the 
EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OCSE) are less relevant players in Greater 
Central Asia than the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). Nonetheless, they bring along specific experience 
and the know-how needed to join forces with the SCO 
and the CSTO as security providers to stabilize borders 
and control drug and arms trafficking, especially from 
Afghanistan. In this context, the OCSE connectivity plat-
form could thus be used as a further valid instrument of 
regional stabilization, integrated with the SCO connectiv-
ity agenda.
By contrast, joint action with both Russia and China is 
likely to be fraught with difficulties in some areas: Among 
these are, for instance, cooperation with local govern-
ments to improve sustainable intra-regional connectivity, 
and the creation of regional supply and value chains in 
sectors such as agro-industry, logistics and automotive. 
Equally difficult to realize with both Moscow and Beijing 
are reforms to support local small and medium-sized 
enterprises, as well as the improvement of the business 
climate for European investors, as envisaged in the new 
Central Asia strategy. 
In these cases, the EU and Germany should join forces 
with leading local nations, especially Uzbekistan, and 
start a more structured form of bilateral and multilat-
eral cooperation. It should be centered on developing a 
common connectivity agenda for Central Asia which also 
includes Afghanistan, and joint connectivity initiatives 
with Japan, India, and Turkey. In light of the EU’s limited 
financial means for this region, the cooperation should 
involve finance – in the form of bilateral and multilateral 
co-financing projects between the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD), the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It 
should also include joint civil engineering projects which 
focus on transregional power grids, the upgrade and 
expansion of rails and roads, and the creation of logistics 
centers as well as industrial parks. 
Greater Eastern Europe: Further Engagement in  
Regional and Trans-Regional Connectivity Initiatives 
Greater Eastern Europe constitutes a core interest region 
for both, Germany and the EU. Especially Germany 
should, therefore, concentrate its efforts on increasing 
the national as well as European financial and political 
resources that are directed toward its geographically 
closest partners – the Visegrad 4 (V4), the Western Balkan 
and the Eastern Partnership countries. As a first step, 
Germany should reinvigorate its political ties with the 
V-4, leveraging the EU’s normative and regulatory power, 
and bringing to bear its regional geo-economic power. 
Employing both, it can tackle the difficult task of finding 
a consensus for a common approach toward Russia and 
China. 
To achieve this, Berlin should consider three different 
kinds of action: 
First, it needs to restore trust with its partners in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE), which have been diplo-
matically neglected in the wake of the controversy about 
the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline. The pipeline is certainly in 
Germany’s legitimate interest, and a securitization of the 
project serves less Ukraine’s security rather than vested 
geo-economic interests of third parties. However, it will 
be crucial for Berlin to prove that it is prepared to use the 
pipeline as a negotiating tool vis-à-vis Moscow in order to 
stabilize Ukraine.39 Berlin should also reassure its Eastern 
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European partners that it will warrant their energy sup-
ply and their security. In this context, Germany could also 
increase its political and military commitment as part of 
the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence.
Second, Berlin should strengthen the coordination 
among the variegated countries of Greater Eastern Europe 
by establishing a regional platform which should include 
the EU members in Central Eastern Europe as well as the 
Western Balkans, and the Eastern Neighborhood Countries. 
A good starting point could be the Three Seas Initiative, 
which was launched in 2015 by Poland and Croatia with 
the open support of the US Administration, and is aimed at 
improving the North-South energy, transport and digital 
connectivity among the 12 Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern European members of the EU.40 The recent partici-
pation of Germany and the EU in the Initiative is, therefore, 
a first step in the right direction.41 Since the US and Poland 
have been eager to promote their own energy and security 
interests inside the initiative,42 however, Berlin should 
clarify the nature of its diplomatic involvement and the 
level of its financial support as soon as possible. While the 
logic of the initiative is sound and very much in Germany’s 
and the EU’s geo-economic interest, Berlin should seek to 
‘Europeanize’ it further to avoid the emergence of paral-
lel institutions with regulations diverging from the EU’s 
norms and standards. The initiative should concentrate its 
actions toward logistic, digital and transport connectivity 
and include the Western Balkans as partner countries. 
Leveraging its active engagement in the Three Seas 
Initiative, Germany should also urge the EU to synchronize 
the implementation of the Northwest-Southeast transport 
and digital connection, that is part of the projects under 
the Three Seas Initiative, with the extension of the TEN-T 
corridors to the Eastern Partnership countries, that was ad-
opted by the EU in November 2018.43 This would accelerate 
the alignment of the traffic volumes along the entire South-
Eastern European transport network. In fact, China’s 
economic and political influence in the Western Balkans 
and in Central Eastern Europe is of serious concern, and 
a long-term challenge, particularly for Germany. To date, 
however, China’s promised investments in this large space 
vary in quantity and quality. So far, they have remained 
relatively low and are increasingly seen with skepticism, 
especially by V4 countries such as the Czech Republic and 
Poland.44 As a result of this, the EU and Germany still hold 
a significant competitive advantage which they should 
leverage to close the infrastructure gap in the region.
Third, Germany and the EU should try to exploit the 
latent strategic competition between China and Russia. 
As part of this, they should engage Moscow and Beijing 
bilaterally in separate projects which are crucial for the 
two powers but not necessarily aligned with their com-
mon agenda.
It is significant in this context that, unlike in Central 
Asia, Russia’s and China’s individual action in Greater 
Eastern Europe has remained uncoordinated. By compari-
son, the EU’s regulatory and financial power – especially 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and 
value chains – and its attractiveness as a political and so-
cial model are sustained by and reflected in a broad range 
of geo-economics tools. These include extensive economic 
integration agreements (EIAs), deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreements (FTA, e.g with Ukraine), Stabili-
zation and Association Agreements (SAA, e.g. with the 
Western Balkans), and Association Agreements such as 
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
In light of this, Berlin should seek to engage Moscow in 
fostering East-West transregional connectivity by improv-
ing the logistical services between Germany and Poland, as 
well as between Poland and Belarus, especially at the bor-
der crossings of Frankfurt/Oder and Brest/Malaschewice. 
Most importantly, however, Berlin should encourage 
the EU to start a political and commercial dialogue with 
the EAEU that looks beyond the sanctions on Russia. This 
could also include a road map toward free trade nego-
tiations, as recently suggested by the German Eastern 
Business Association.45 While the sanctions will continue 
to limit cooperation with both, Russia and the EAEU, it 
would be wise to explore possible options for dialogue 
and to exploit any room to maneuver for cooperation 
in other fields. Using the institutional framework of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, this relates particularly to the 
issues of physical and digital connectivity. Reinvigorat-
ing a trialogue on connectivity with Warsaw and Moscow 
would be a difficult but needed first step in this context.
With China, the EU should discuss expanding, extend-
ing and aligning the TEN-I and the TEN-T corridors in the 
ENP region, and eventually pursue trans-Caspian inter-
modal solutions which by-pass Russia. This would be very 
much in line with China’s interest in developing different 
BRI corridors, and in silently by-passing Russia. It would 
also correspond to other sub-regional initiatives like the 
Black Sea-Eastern Mediterranean Initiative, or the Black 
Sea Motorway of the Sea project, which is strongly sup-
ported by Turkey.
The Road Ahead: Toward a Coordinated Invest-
ment and Industrial Policy Offensive for Eurasia
Apart from setting strategic goals, assessing feasible 
options and instruments for action, and geographically 
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prioritizing the German and European agenda for Eurasia, 
Brussels and Berlin should commit greater financial 
means to Eurasia’s physical connectivity. To safeguard 
the success of Germany’s and the EU’s future strategy for 
this vast emerging region, the budgets involved should go 
well beyond the means and instruments envisaged by the 
current EU connectivity strategy. 
The current strategy is undoubtedly a significant step 
forward: It refers to financial commitments in the form of 
loans, grants, or guarantees to mobilize further invest-
ments, proposes “an investment framework for external 
action”, and prioritizes action in the EU’s direct neighbor-
hood.46 Nonetheless, the document does fall short of true 
financial commitments: It cites the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD) as the main instrument 
for finance, when, in fact, the EFSD does not specifically 
target Eurasia. It primarily serves Africa and the Neigh-
borhood countries and caters for Central Asia and the 
Asia-Pacific region only marginally. Of course, the priori-
tization of the Neighborhood is understandable in light of 
the EU’s limited resources and its interest in its Southern 
and Eastern periphery. However, even the means envis-
aged for the Neighborhood countries remain well below 
the sums required to improve transport networks in 
Greater Eastern Europe.
As of today, it is too early to estimate the actual amount 
of funds that the EFSD will need to mobilize for Eurasian 
connectivity. Nonetheless, some data is available to shed 
light on the gap between the means that are envisaged 
and the investments that are actually required, particu-
larly in the broader Eastern European region.
The EU claims “to look to combine financial resources 
from international financial institutions, multilateral 
development banks and the private sector, building on 
the success of the Juncker Plan and the EU’s External 
Investment Plan [of which the EFSD is part of], which are 
on track to mobilize investment worth 500 billion EUR 
[by 2020] and 44 billion EUR respectively.”47 As of April 
2019, the Juncker plan, which is directed to EU members, 
has reportedly mobilized 392 billion EUR. However, this 
sum helped to finance particularly small business as well 
as research and development (R&D) projects (55 percent). 
It has only partially supported intra-European energy (19 
percent), digital (11 percent) and transport (7 percent) 
connectivity projects.48
By contrast, the investments required for the comple-
tion of the EU’s TEN-T core network corridors alone are 
estimated to amount to between 750 and 900 billion 
EUR for the period from 2020 to 203049, and this does 
not include any additional means needed to extend the 
corridors to the Eastern Partnership countries. Moreover, 
the EU is aware of its financial gap in the TEN-T infra-
structure funding scheme, as a large part of the necessary 
funds is to be provided by nation states. 
The gap between commitments and required invest-
ments is even more glaring for Greater Central Asia. Asia 
will need more than 1.7 trillion EUR per year of infrastruc-
ture investment over the coming decade, with South-Cen-
tral Asia requiring the second-most amount of investments, 
after East Asia.50 Against this backdrop, the EU’s commit-
ments for the External Investment Plan – an envisaged 
increase of 40 billion EUR in the budget of the European 
External Action Service in the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2021-2027, and further funds via instru-
ments like the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) 
and the Investment Facility for Asia (IFA) – represent an 
obviously important yet insufficient commitment.
It is clear then, that, in the short to medium term, the 
EU will not be able to significantly increase its financial 
commitments in Greater Central Asia. Instead, it will 
need to focus on Greater Central Eastern Europe. To 
significantly improve physical connectivity among its 
members, its direct Eastern neighbors, and the Western 
regions of Eurasia, from Russia to the Caucasus and 
Turkey, however, the EU will need to mobilize much more 
public and private capital much faster. 
To achieve requires not only a strengthening and fur-
ther consolidation of EU instruments, and an increased 
participation of the private sector. It will especially be 
up to national governments to make a greater financial 
effort in cross-regional and cross-national infrastructure 
building. In particular, Germany should overcome its 
traditional skepticism toward public infrastructure in-
vestment, both at home and abroad. Of course, this move 
should not pave the way for an uncontrolled and unpri-
oritized wave of infrastructure projects across Europe. 
To be recommended is a mix of debt-financed additional 
investment, and a better strategic allocation, reallocation, 
and pooling of existing national and European means. 
The EU should, therefore, prioritize areas, regions and 
corridors crucial for connecting Europe’s industrially and 
demographically rich areas as well as its supply and value 
chains with Greater Eastern Europe and, beyond that, 
with Greater Central Asia. 
Starting within Europe, a big push should be given 
to the completion of the strategically crucial East-West 
and North-South connections between Central Europe, 
Central Eastern Europe, and Western Eurasia. According 
to estimates, this would, in the long run, require invest-
ments of roughly one trillion EUR.51 It would be more 
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realistic to focus on an accelerated mobilization of the 
means needed to complete the TEN-T and TEN-I corridors. 
Here, priority should be given to the belt stretching from 
Southern Germany, Northern Italy, and South East France 
to the Danube Plain, and the Black Sea, to the South, and 
to Warsaw, and Moscow to the North. 
Furthermore, a more pronounced geo-economic and 
Eurasian component should be added to the new Europe-
an industrial strategy as envisaged in the newly approved, 
joint German-French manifesto.52 Ideally, a European 
industrial strategy should not only protect and support 
European manufacturing and the development of new 
technologies in Europe, but also proactively support their 
action abroad. The EU could, for instance, introduce more 
restrictive procurement regulations for non-European 
companies and give privileged access to EU or EIB/EBRD 
loans and grants for European companies. It would, there-
by, allow the creation of European champions and foster 
the cooperation among highly specialized small and 
medium-sized enterprises. This would increase Europe’s 
strategic assets in the competition with Chinese and Rus-
sian companies in a vast number of sectors, ranging from 
new telecommunication technologies, via artificial intel-
ligence, e-automotive, industrial digitalization, and high-
speed trains, to include also more classic civil engineering 
areas, such as rail, road and port construction.
Conclusion
The rapidly fragmenting world order has brought the re-
turn of great power politics, imperial legacies, economic 
and political nationalism, as well as regional spheres of 
influence in recent years. This trend has also been erod-
ing the attractiveness of the liberal model of governance 
as well as its norms, standards, practices, and institutions. 
Nowhere is this phenomenon more visible and nowhere 
are its consequences more dramatic for Europe than 
across the Eurasian mega-continent. 
In Eurasia, China, and Russia are emerging as the 
champions of a more fluid, interconnected but instable 
world system. However, also participating in, and 
impacted by this process are the dynamically growing 
markets in Southeast Asia and India, as well as the crisis 
regions stretching from North Africa and the Middle 
East, to include Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 
They all make up a geographically contiguous space, in 
which maritime and continental trade routes increasingly 
intersect, and instability easily spills over from one region 
to another. 
Following a major political and economic reorienta-
tion which pre-dates China’s Belt and Roads Initiative 
and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, this vast space 
has started to cohere, while comparatively, Europe has 
been suffering political and economic marginalization. It 
is against this backdrop, that the EU and particularly its 
leading geo-economic power, Germany, face the chal-
lenge of pursuing their own strategy for Eurasia – well 
aware and in consideration of the strategic interests and 
concrete involvements of China and Russia in this region. 
Brussels and Berlin should do so confidently: They should 
more openly support, defend and expand their legitimate 
own economic and trade interests, and promote their 
own rules, standards, and norms, while enhancing good 
governance and the internal and external security of the 
countries in Eurasia. In doing so, they should not preclude 
the chance of cooperating with both, China and Russia, 
where this is possible. 
Europe will need to cope with its own limits, and 
compete hard, effectively, and pragmatically to defend, 
promote, and realize its interests in the broader Eurasian 
space. This paper has suggested that the EU should engage 
China and Russia especially in two vast sub-regions, Great-
er Central Asia and Greater Eastern Europe. Rather than 
prioritizing any particular instrument, it should do so by 
means of a complex game of competition, cooperation and 
hedging. This will involve weighing up the EU’s interests 
and resources, as well as its possible political and economic 
leverage in order to determine the grade of involvement 
and the options for action in each of these regions. 
The EU and Germany will, therefore, have to act auda-
ciously and in an interest-driven way, facing only ad-hoc 
and temporary relationships rather than stable,  
value-based partnerships. This course, undoubtedly, 
represents a huge jump for the EU and Germany, as it 
transcends their traditional strategic approach of think-
ing in win-win terms. It also presents an enormous task, 
as defining common political goals, coordination mecha-
nisms, and foreign policy priorities among the EU mem-
bers is a difficult and long-term exercise – especially in 
such a diverse and complex environment as Eurasia. The 
price of non-action, passive reaction, or wrong action will, 
however, be increasing external marginalization, internal 
fragmentation and geopolitical insignificance.
Dr Jacopo Maria Pepe is Research Fellow at the Robert 
Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Central Asia of the German Council on Foreign Relations 
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